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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff-Appellee,

Case No. 890152

v.
Category No. 2

STEVEN TROY SPANN,
Defendant-Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLEE
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This is an appeal from a conviction of aggravated
arson, a first degree felony, under Utah Code Ann. § 76-6103(l)(a) (Supp. 1989).
This Court has jurisdiction to hear the appeal under
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(i) (Supp. 1989).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
The following issues are presented on appeal:
1.

Did the trial court properly deny defendant's

motion to quash the jury which was based on defendant's
allegation that the prosecutor had exercised a peremptory
challenge in a racially discriminatory manner?
2.

Was there prosecutorial misconduct at trial that

constitutes grounds for reversal of defendantr s conviction?
3.

Was there sufficient evidence presented at trial to

support defendant's conviction?

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
Relevant text of constitutional and statutory
provisions pertinent to the resolution of the issues presented on
appeal is contained in the body of this brief.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant, Steven Troy Spann, was charged with
aggravated arson, a first degree felony, under Utah Code Ann.
§ 76-6-103(1) (Supp. 1989) (R. 6). A jury found him guilty as
charged (R. 55). The trial court sentenced defendant to the Utah
State Prison for a term of five years to life (R. 61).
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Given the issues presented on appeal, a lengthy
recitation of the facts is not necessary.
was presented at trial.

Conflicting evidence

The following evidence supports the

jury's verdict.
At approximately 3:20 a.m. on November 16, 1988, an
intense fire was reported burning in a second floor apartment at
2800 South Adams in Salt Lake County which had recently been

rented by Barbara Lee (T. 90-91, 137-47, 156-57, 211-15, 308-09).
A team of investigators who examined the scene after the fire had
been extinguished concluded that, based on the nature and burn
pattern of the fire and evidence that an accelerant had been used
to start the fire (e.g., the presence oE observable "pour
patterns" —

see State v. Nickles, 728 P.2d 123, 126 (Utah

1986)), the fire had been intentionally set (T. 221-272, 282,
285, 296). The team excluded the possibility of an accidental
fire (T. 276-77).
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Nine days prior to the fire, Ms. Lee, who had been
living with defendant for approximately two years and had borne a
daughter by him, broke off the relationship with defendant.
upset defendant.

This

Lee moved to her father's house which was

adjacent to defendant's residence.

On the day of their break-up,

Lee heard the windshield on her car being broken, and upon
investigating, noticed defendant near the car.

Shortly

thereafter, defendant initiated a violent argument with Lee at
her father's house which resulted in defendant forcibly removing
the couple's daughter and returning to his residence with her.
Subsequently, defendant moved all of Lee's possessions out of his
residence and on to the back porch (T. 309-310, 316, 336-41).
On November 13, 1988, defendant cracked the recently
repaired windshield on Lee's car during an argument with her and
as she attempted to drive away from his apartment.

The next day,

Lee, with the help of a male friend named Randy Brown, retrieved
her belongings from defendant's porch and began moving into the
apartment at 2800 South Adams.

During the day of November 15,

defendant visited that apartment and in a conversation with Lee
discussed the poor security of the apartment (i.e., the locks to
the door were not particularly secure).

On the evening of the

15th, defendant showed up at Lee's place of employment, a bar.
Although the sequence of events is not entirely clear after this
point, Randy Brown, who was also at the bar, noticed defendant
leave the bar at around 11:00 p.m.

Approximately five minutes

later, Brown went outside to the parking lot and discovered that
the grill and headlights on his truck had been heavily damaged.

-3-

Lee later discovered that the taillights on her car, which was
parked outside the bar, had also been damaged.

Sometime after

Brown had returned to the bar from his trip to the parking lot,
defendant reappeared at the bar, walked by Brown, and said, "I
kicked your headlights out."

In reference to Lee, defendant said

to Brown, "So you're Barbara's boyfriend?"

When Brown answered

in the negative and explained that he was just a friend helping
out Lee, defendant remarked, "Well, I gave up that shit a long
time ago, anyway."

Defendant then left the bar (T. 315-16,. 319-

22, 344-46, 379-82).
When Lee and Brown left the bar at closing time, Brown
noticed defendant in the parking lot.

Lee drove in her car with

Brown to a restaurant and then accompanied Brown to his residence
where she spent the night, due to her fear of defendant (T. 32831).
At approximately 4:15 a.m. on November 16, Karen
Bateman, an acquaintance of defendant's, answered a knock on her
door and found defendant there.

Defendant told her that he had

stopped to say goodbye because he was going home (apparently to
Las Vegas).

He then said either "Barbara's apartment is in

flames," or "I flamed Barbara's apartment."

Defendant previously

had threatened to blow up Lee's car and to burn her house and her
father's house (T. 389-405, 409, 425-26).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Because defendant failed to meet the standing
requirement of Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986), the trial
court properly rejected his Batson objection and denied his
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motion to quash.

Furthermore, his alternative arguments for

standing were not raised in the trial court and therefore should
not be considered for the first time on appeal.

However, even if

standing is assumed, arguendo, the court's denial of defendant's
motion to quash was proper because defendant failed to present
any evidence to establish that Vietnamese-Americans are a
cognizable racial group for purposes of equal protection, fair
cross-section, or due process analysis.
Defendant fails to establish that the prosecutorial
misconduct that occurred in this case constitutes grounds for
reversal of his conviction.

Therefore, the Court should uphold

the trial court's denial of defendant's motion for a mistrial.
Finally, there was sufficient evidence to support
defendant's conviction of aggravated arson.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DENIED DEFENDANT'S
MOTION TO QUASH THE JURY.
Before the jury in defendant's case was sworn,
defendant moved to quash the jury, alleging that under Batson v.
Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986), and State v. Cantu, 750 P.2d 581
(Utah 1988) ("Cantu I M ) , the prosecutor had impermissibly
exercised a peremptory challenge to strike a minority person from
the jury venire (T. 62-68).

Without defining the term

"minority," defendant argued that "minority [persons] are more
likely than other members of the citizenry to vote for
The portion of the transcript relevant to defendant's motion to
quash is attached to defendant's brief on appeal as "Appendix 1."
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acquittal," and that the prosecutor had exercised, on racial
grounds, one of his peremptories to strike a minority from the
jury panel, Mr. Viet Phung, who apparently was a Vietnamese2
American.
grounds:

The trial court denied defendant's motion on two
(1) that the motion was not timely; and (2) that

defendant failed to show he was a member of a cognizable racial
group as required by Batson and Cantu I (T. 65, 69).
On appeal, defendant argues that, because he made a
prime facie showing that the prosecutor exercised a peremptory
challenge on Mr. Phung in a racially discriminatory manner and
the prosecutor failed to provide a racially neutral explanation
for the challenge, the trial court erred in not granting his
motion to quash.

He asserts that his motion was timely and that

although he and Mr. Phung were not members of the same race, he
had standing to challenge the prosecutor's allegedly
discriminatory use of a peremptory challenge under the fourteenth
amendment equal protection analysis of Batson f the due process
analysis of Peters v. Kiff, 407 U.S. 493 (1972) (plurality
opinion), and the sixth amendment fair cross-section/impartial
jury analysis presented in other case law. Each of these claims
3
will be dealt with in turn.
2
The record is not entirely clear regarding Mr. Phungrs race.
During voir dire, the court's questioning of him was very limited
(T. 19). Mr. Phung simply stated that he had graduated from high
school in Viet Nam and had been a citizen (presumably of the
United States) for about nine years (T. 19).
3
Although the prosecutor responded to defendant's motion (T. 6365), that response was not made pursuant to an order of the trial
court to provide a racially neutral explanation for th€>
peremptory challenge to Mr. Phung, as is required under Batson
and Cantu I once the defendant has made out a prima facie case of
•6-

The State agrees that defendant's "Batson" motion was
timely.4

His citation to Utah Code Ann. § 78-46-16 (Supp. 1989)

and Utah R. Crim. P. 18 (Utah Code Ann. § 77-35-18 (1982)
(repealed effective July 1, 1990)) support his position that his
motion, made shortly after the prosecution peremptorily
challenged Mr. Phung and before the jury was sworn, was timely.
3
Cont. discrimination (see fn. 4, infra at 7). The prosecutor
simply was responding with argument to defendant's motion.
Therefore, in the event this Court has occasion to do so, the
prosecutor's argument cannot fairly be construed as a Batson
"explanation" and should not be evaluated as such. If this Court
were to determine that, under the circumstances of this case,
defendant established a prima facie case such that the prosecutor
should be required to provide a racially neutral explanation for
his strike of Mr. Phung, the case should be remanded to the trial
court for that purpose. See Cantu I, 750 P.2d at 597. However,
in light of the arguments that follow, the Court should not have
to reach that question.
4
Defendant's motion to quash, which did not ask the court to
require the prosecutor to provide a racially neutral explanation
for the peremptory strike of Mr. Phung but instead seemingly
requested a quashal solely on the basis that the prosecutor had
stricken a "minority" (T. 62-63), was technically incorrect. See
Batson, 476 U.S. at 97; Cantu I, 750 P.2d at 595-96 (if the
defendant meets the burden of establishing a prima facie case of
discrimination, the prosecution must then come forward with a
racially neutral reason related to the particular case to be
tried to explain the challenge). As noted in Cantu I:
While a single challenge based on race is
impermissible, People v. Brown, 152
Ill.App.3d 996, 1001, 106 111.Dec. 91, 94,
505 N.E.2d 397, 400 (1987), the mere fact
that the subject of the peremptory strike is
a minority member does not alone raise the
inference of discriminatory intent. "[I]t is
not unconstitutional, without more, to strike
one or more [Hispanics] from the jury."
Batson, 476 U.S. at 79, 106 S.Ct. at 1725, 90
L.Ed.2d at 91 (White, J., concurring).
750 P.2d at 597 (footnotes omitted). However, this deficiency in
the motion, although perhaps an independent ground for affirming
the trial court's ruling, becomes relatively insignificant in
light of the more basic flaws in defendant's motion which are
discussed infra.

See State v. Bankhead, 727 P.2d 216, 217 (Utah 1986) (section 7846-16(1) requires that any challenge to the jury must be lodged
before the jury is sworn); People v. Harris, 542 N.Y.S.2d 411
(A.D. 1989) (to be timely, an objection pursuant to Batson must
be made before the jury, or the last juror including alternates,
is sworn).
However, defendant's arguments concerning the merits of
his motion do not fare as well.

First, his claim that Batson can

be read to allow any criminal defendant to object to a peremptory
strike of a prospective juror who is a member of a cognizable
racial group without regard to whether the defendant is also a
member of that cognizable racial group, ignores the plain
language of Batson.

As explained by this Court, under Batson,

[t]he use of a peremptory challenge solely
on the basis of race violates equal
protection. The party attacking a peremptory
challenge must establish a prima facie case.
The burden then shifts to the challenged
party to show the existence of a racially
neutral reason for the challenge.
State v. Cantu, 778 P.2d 517, 518 (Utah 1989) ("Cantu II") . And,
[t]o attack a peremptory challenge under
Batson, the defendant must establish a prima
facie case by showing (1) that he is a member
of a cognizable racial group, (2) that the
prosecution exercised peremptory challenges
to remove from the panel members of the
defendant's race, and (3) that all the
relevant facts and circumstances raise an
inference that the prosecution used its
peremptory challenges to exclude the
veniremen from the petit jury on account of
their race.
Cantu I, 750 P.2d at 595.

See Batson, 476 U.S. at 96. Batson,

as part of its equal protection analysis under the fourteenth
amendment, explicitly requires that the defendant establish a
-8-

prima facie case of discrimination by showing, first, that he or
she is a member of a cognizable racial group and, second, that
the prosecutor struck panel members of the defendant's race.
Thus, contrary to the argument defendant made below and now makes
on appeal, there must be racial identity between the defendant
and the subject of the prosecutor's peremptory challenge for the
defendant to have standing to object to the challenge under
Batson.

In short, to establish an equal protection violation

under Batson, membership in the excluded group is a threshold
requirement for the defendant.

Batson, 476 U.S. at 94.

In Cantu

JL, this Court obviously recognized this requirement when it
concluded that the defendant, a Hispanic, had met the first prong
of Batson by showing that the panel member was also Hispanic.
750 P.2d at 596.
Although defendant urges the Court to adopt the
reasoning of the majority opinion in State v. Superior Court
(Maricopa County), 156 Ariz. 512, 753 P.2d 1168 (Ariz. App.
1987), a decision from the Arizona Court of Appeals which
rejected a reading of Batson that would require that the
defendant be of the same race as the stricken jurors to have
standing to object, that reasoning has not been accepted by
Arizona's highest court, see State v. Superior Court (Maricopa
County), 157 Ariz. 541, 545, 760 P.2d 541, 545 (Ariz. 1988) (en
5
banc), and does not reflect the better reasoned view adopted by
5
Recognizing the misinterpretation of Batson by the court of
appeals, the Arizona Supreme Court, in reviewing that court's
decision, chose to analyze the standing issue under the fair
cross-section requirement of the sixth amendment, rather than the
fourteenth amendment's equal protection clause, and concluded
-9-

numerous courts and commentators.

See, e.g., State v. Gorman,

315 Md. 402, 554 A.2d 1203, 1209-10 (1989); State v. Superior
Court, 157 Ariz, at 545 n.2, 760 P.2d at 545 n.2 (citing cases);
Note, Due Process Limits On Prosecutorial Peremptory Challenges,
102 Harv. L. Rev. 1013, 1018 n.37 (1989) (hereafter Note,
Peremptory Challenges); Note, Sixth Amendment Reform of
Peremptory Challenges —

State v. Superior Court, 157 Ariz. 541,

760 P.2d 541 (1988) (en banc), 21 Ariz. St. L-J. 327, 333 (1989)
(hereafter Note, Sixth Amendment Reform of Pejremptory
Challenges).

The major flaw in the majority opinion of the

Arizona Court of Appeals in State v. Superior Court is its
unjustified application to Batson of Peters v, Kiff, 407 U.S. 493
(1972) (plurality opinion), where Justice Marshall and the two
members of the Court who joined his opinion concluded that a
white defendant had standing under the Due Process Clause of the
fourteenth amendment to challenge the systematic exclusion of
blacks from the initial draw for grand and petit juries. Peters,
unlike Batson, did not involve peremptory challenges and
therefore cannot reasonably be applied to read out of Batson the
explicit requirement that the defendant be of the same race as
the excluded venireman.

See State v. Superior: Court, 156 Ariz,

at 516-17, 753 P.2d at 1172-73 (Shelley, J., dissenting).
Therefore, under the correct reading of Batson,
defendant, who was Caucasian (T. 68), did not have standing to
object to the prosecution's allegedly discriminatory use of a
Cont. that a Caucasian defendant had standing to object to the
prosecution's peremptory challenges to strike black veniremen.
157 Ariz, at 544-46, 760 P.2d at 544-46.
-10-

peremptory challenge to strike Mr. Phungf who defendant maintains
was a Vietnamese-American,

Insofar as the trial court's denial

of defendant's motion on the ground that defendant failed to show
he was a member of a cognizable racial group can be interpreted
as a ruling that defendant and Mr. Phung were not members of the
same cognizable racial group as required by Batson, it should be
affirmed.

Even if it cannot be so interpreted, the court's

ruling should be affirmed under the principle that this Court may
uphold the trial court's ruling on any proper ground.

See State

v. Bryan, 709 P.2d 257, 260 (Utah 1985) ("[T]his Court may affirm
the trial court's decision on any proper grounds, even though the
trial court assigned another reason for its ruling.").
In the alternative, defendant argues that this Court,
pursuant to article I, section 24 of the Utah Constitution,
could grant any criminal defendant standing to raise a Batsontype equal protection objection without regard to whether the
particular defendant is a member of the same cognizable racial
group as the excluded venireman.

As an initial matter, the Court

should not address this alternative argument under the state
constitution on the ground that defendant did not raise the
argument below.

Defendant's argument in the trial court was

based solely on Batson and Cantu and the federal constitutional
analysis contained therein.

It is well settled that in the

absence of exceptional circumstances, this Court will not review

Article I, section 24 of the Utah Constitution provides:
All laws of a general nature shall have
uniform operation.
-11-

matters raised for the first time on appeal.
660 P.2d 252, 254 (Utah 1983).

State v. Steggell,

This rule is equally applicable

to constitutional claims raised for the first time on appeal.
See, e.g., State v. Van Matre, 777 P.2d 459, 463 (Utah 1989)
(refusing to address the defendant's due process claim which was
raised for the first time on appeal); S'cate v., Loe, 732 P.2d 115,
117 (Utah 1987) (defendant's constitutional claim, raised for the
first time on appeal, would not be reviewed).

And, the principle

logically applies where the defendant raises a state
constitutional argument for the first time on appeal.

See State

v. Johnson, 771 P.2d 326, 327-28 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) (refusing
to address the defendant's state constitutional argument which
was not presented to the trial court) . £f. State v. Carter, 707
P.2d 656, 660 (Utah 1985) ("[W]here a defendant fails to assert a
particular [constitutional] ground for suppressing unlawfully
obtained evidence in the trial court, an appellate court will not
consider that ground on appeal).
The foregoing waiver argument is also applicable to
defendant's additional arguments regarding due process (citing
Peters v. Kiff, 407 U.S. 493 (1972), and article I, section 7 of
the Utah Constitution), trial by an impartial jury (citing the
sixth amendment analysis of Booker v. Jabe, 775 F.2d 762 (6th
Cir. 1985), on remand, 801 F.2d 871 (6th Cir. 1986), cert.
denied, 479 U.S. 1046 (1987); article I, section 12 of the Utah
Constitution; and various state decisions interpreting state
constitutional provisions designed to insure impartial juries
through representation of a fair cross-section of the community

-1?-

on the jury (e.g., People v. Wheeler, 22 Cal.3d 258, 148
Cal.Rptr. 890, 583 P.2d 748 (1978)), and state and federal jury
selection laws (citing 18 U.S.C. § 243 and Utah Code Ann. §§ 7846-2 and -3 (1987)).

See Br. of Appellant at 15-22.

None of

those arguments was presented to the trial court; therefore, they
should not be considered by this Court for the first time on
appeal.
However, even if the Court were either to accept
defendant's proposed interpretation of Batson (under which he
would have standing to raise a Batson objection) or to look past
the waiver discussed above and assume, arguendo, that a criminal
defendant, regardless of his or her race, has standing under the
federal and/or state constitutional guarantees of due process,
trial by an impartial jury, and equal protection (as argued
alternatively by defendant) to object to the prosecution's
allegedly racially discriminatory use of peremptory challenges,

7

Defendant's statutory arguments are effectively subsumed within
his constitutional arguments, in that the statutes he cites
merely reflect constitutional guarantees under the federal and
state constitutions. See Peters, 407 U.S. at 498 (plurality
opinion), at 506-07 (White, J., concurring) (discussing 18 U.S.C.
§ 243 and its relationship to the fourteenth amendment).
Furthermore, with respect to defendant's citations to Utah Code
Ann. §§ 78-46-2, -3 and -16 (1987 & Supp. 1989), sections of the
Jury Selection and Service Act, this Court in State v. Tillman,
750 P.2d 546, 574 n.115 (Utah 1987), decided that "constitutional
challenges to [jury] panels should be brought outside the
framework of the Act." This same reasoning logically applies to
constitutional challenges to the petit jury selected.
Also, there are clear divisions in the courts on the due
process and impartial jury/fair cross-section issues defendant
raises. A comparison of the majority and dissenting opinions in
the Arizona Court of Appeals case of State v. Superior Court, 156
Ariz, at 514-18, 753 P.2d at 1170-74, well illustrates the
opposing views on the applicability of the Supreme Court's
decision in Peters to the peremptory challenge issue the Court
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the Court would still be obligated to uphold the trial court's

Cont. later addressed in Batson. Even more distinct is the
split on the question of whether the impartial jury/fair crosssection analysis under the sixth amendment is applicable to
peremptory challenges. Compare, e.g., State v. Gorman, 315 Md.
402, 554 A.2d 1203, 1210-11 (1989), with Fields v. People, 732
P.2d 1145 (Colo. 1987). See also State v. Bishop, 753 P.2d 439,
456-57 (Utah 1988) (discussing the applicability of sixth
amendment fair cross-section analysis to peremptory challenges in
light of Batson and Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162 (1986)).
That issue may soon be resolved by the Supreme Court in Holland
v. Illinois, 109 S. Ct. 1309 (1989) (granting certiorari), where
the questions presented are: (1) does the State's use of
peremptory challenges to exclude Blacks from the trial jury
violate the defendant's sixth amendment right to an impartial
jury; and (2) does a Caucasian defendant have standing to object
to the exclusion of Blacks from his jury? See Note, Sixth
Amendment Reform of Peremptory Challenges, 21 Ariz. St. L.J. at
345.
Finally, there are serious conceptual problems with
defendant's suggestion that an equal protection challenge to
allegedly discriminatory use of peremptories by the prosecution
is available to a defendant regardless of his or her race.
"Under equal protection doctrine the right to be tried before a
jury of one's peers is not so clearly undermined where the
excluded jurors are not members of the same group as the
defendant." Fields, 732 P.2d at 1150. As stated by this Court
in Tillman:
Although fair cross-section cLaims are in
certain respects analogous to discrimination
claims under the equal protection clause of
the fourteenth amendment, there are
significant distinctions which must be
observed. See, e.g., Duren, 439 U.S. at 368
n.26, 99 S.Ct. at 670 n.26. For example,
because in sixth amendment challenges the
focus is on fair cross-sectio.i issues and not
on the issue of discrimination, a defendant
is not required to show bad faith, and a
prima facie showing of systematic exclusion
may not be rebutted by proof of a
nondiscriminatory intent. United States v.
Jenison, 485 F.Supp. 655, 660 (S.D.Fla.
1979). Additionally, standing exists
regardless of the race or class of a
defendant. Duren, 439 U.S. at 359 n.l, 99
S.Ct. at 666 n.l.
750 P.2d at 575 n.126.
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denial of defendant's motion to quash.
Under all the analyses defendant proffers on appeal, to
prevail on a claim of racial discrimination the defendant must
show exclusion of members of a cognizable racial group.

See

Batson, 476 U.S. at 96 (setting out cognizable racial group
requirement in equal protection context); State v. Tillman, 750
P.2d 546, 575 (Utah 1987) ("A prima facie violation of the fair
cross-section guarantee is established where a defendant shows:
. . . [T]hat the group alleged to be excluded is a "distinctive"
group in the community . . . .") (citing Duren v. Missouri, 439
U.S. 357, 364 (1979)); Peters, 407 U.S. at 503 (plurality
opinion) (which talks about exclusion from ju3:y service of "a
substantial and identifiable class of citizens" in due process
context).

Because each of the three analyses—Batson (equal

protection), Duren (fair cross-section), and Peters (due
process)—views peremptories as potentially harmful only if
exercised to eliminate members of discrete groups, they all
require proof of cognizability.

See Batson, 478 U.S. at 96;

Roman v. Abrams, 822 F.2d 214, 227-28 (2d Cir. 1987), cert.
denied, 109 S. Ct. 1311 (1989) (recognizing cognizability
requirement for sixth amendment impartial jury/fair cross-section
o

analysis of discriminatory use of peremptory challenges);
o

See also People v. Wheeler, 22 Cal.3d 258, 148 Cal.Rptr. 890,
902, 583 P.2d 748, 761 (1978) (which recognized the cognizability
requirement in holding that, under the representative crosssection requirements of the sixth amendment to the United States
Constitution and article I, section 16 of the California
Constitution, peremptory challenges could not be used to exclude
prospective jurors on the basis of membership in an identifiable
group distinguished on racial, religious, ethnic, or similar
grounds).

Peters, 407 U.S. at 503.

See also Notef Peremptory Challenges,

102 Harv. L. Rev. at 1019-21 (recognizing and then criticizing
the cognizability requirement inherent in both equal protection
and fair cross-section analyses).

q

Accordingly, defendant was

obligated to establish in the trial court that Mr. Phung,
apparently a Vietnamese-American, was a member of a cognizable
racial group.

However, he presented no evidence or argument on

that point to the trial court, apparently assuming that
Vietnamese-Americans are necessarily a cognizable racial group.
His arguments on appeal are based on that same, unsupported
assumption.
Although "courts have pointedLy disagreed upon the
proper standard to apply in determining cognizability under
Batson and have struggled repeatedly in deciding whether a
particular classification satisfies the cognizability standards,"
Note, Peremptory Challenges, 102 Harv. L. Rev. at 1020 (footnotes
omitted), something more than the assumption upon which defendant
proceeds in the instant case is required.

A brief overview of

the law in this area and this Court's treatment of the
cognizability issue will illustrate this point.
This Court first had occasion to address the cognizable
or distinct group question in a pair of capital murder cases —

Because defendant does not argue for a different analysis of
the cognizability requirement under the state constitutional
provisions he cites, this Court should not consider that issue.
See State v. Lafferty, 749 P.2d 1239, 1247 n.5 (Utah 1988) ("As a
general rule, we will not engage in a state constitutional
analysis unless an argument for different analyses under the
state and federal constitutions are briefed."). Accordingly, the
State will not address it.

State v. Bishop, 753 P.2d 439, 457 (Utah 1988), and State v.
Tillman, 750 P.2d 546, 573-77 (Utah 1987).

The Court's analysis

in Tillman was made applicable to both defendemts.

Bishop, 753

P.2d at 457. There, the defendants argued that the panels from
which their juries were selected did noc contain a fair crosssection of the community because "using voter registration lists
as the exclusive source of selecting potential jurors leads to
the systematic underrepresentation of racial and ethnic
minorities, particularly Hispanics, on panels in Salt Lake
County."

Tillman, 750 P.2d at 573.

In addressing that argument,

the Court stated:
The sixth amendment to the United States
Constitution guarantees an accused trial by
an impartial jury. The fourteenth amendment
to the United States Constitution
incorporates the sixth amendment's fair trial
guarantees and makes them applicable to the
states. The selection of petit juries from a
representative cross-section of the community
is an essential component of the sixth
amendment's right to a jury trial.
The use of voter registration lists as the
sole source of obtaining prospective jurors
is not impermissible absent a showing of some
impropriety in the process. For example,
such "impropriety" might be demonstrated if
those lists resulted in the systematic
exclusion of a cognizable group or class of
citizens or if there was discrimination in
the compilation of such lists. Moreover,
while jurors must be drawn from a source
fairly representative of the community, each
jury need not "mirror" the community:
"Defendants are not entitled to a jury of any
particular composition."
Id. at 574-75 (footnote citations omitted).

Noting that one

component of establishing a prima facie violation of the fair
cross-section guarantee is "that the group alleged to be excluded
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is a 'distinctive' group in the community," id. at 575 (citing
Puren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 364 (1979)), the Court stated:
Although Bishop claimed that all racial
and ethnic minorities were excluded from Salt
Lake County venires, defendants focus on
appeal upon Hispanics. Bishop contends that
Hispanics are distinctive because they are
designated in a separate category in census
figures and because they are "segregated by
religion, economic status and cultural
background from the majority of county
residents." Similarly, the State would have
us assume that Hispanics are a distinctive
group for fair cross-section purposes. We
believe such an assumption is too hastily
made. For purposes of the equal protection
clause, Hispanics may be a distinctive group.
But it does not necessarily follow that they
are distinctive in Salt Lake County for fair
cross-section purposes.
Bishop relies upon People v. Harris,
wherein the California Supreme Court found
that Hispanics were a distinctive group for
purposes of fair cross-section analysis.
However, Harris is not persuasive on this
point. Taylor v. Louisiana and Duren v.
Missouri note that a particular group must be
of sufficient numerosity and distinctiveness
to be cognizable for fair cross-section
purposes. This standard certainly implies a
factual determination which turns upon the
relevant characteristics of the particular
community. Therefore, although Hispanics may
be a distinctive group in California for
purposes of the sixth amendment, it does not
follow that they constitute such a group in
Utah.
Id. at 575-76 (footnotes and footnote citations omitted).

The

Court then concluded that the failure of both Bishop and Tillman
to offer any evidence to support their claim ichat Hispanics are a
distinctive group in Salt Lake County was fatal to their sixth
amendment claim.

:id. at 576.

For precisely the same reason,

defendant's sixth amendment argument, although made in a slightly
different context, must fail.

He did not present to the trial
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court, and does not offer on appeal, any evidence to establish
that Vietnamese-Americans are a distinctive group in Salt Lake
County, the location of his trial.

See also United States v.

Sgro, 816 F.2d 30, 33 (1st Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S.
1063 (1988).
This Court seemingly has taken a somewhat different
approach with respect to the Batson equal protection analysis
under the fourteenth amendment.

In Tillman, the Court, citing

Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475, 479-80 (1954), observed that
"[f]or purposes of the equal protection clause, Hispanics may be
a distinctive group."

750 P.2d at 575. However, in a footnote,

the Court qualified this by adding that M[e]ven the Court in
Hernandez warned that whether such a group did in fact exist was
a question of fact in any given community."
(citing Hernandez, 347 U.S. at 478).

Ici. at 575 n.125

Nevertheless, in Cantu I,

when confronted directly with the question in the Batson context,
the Court simply stated, in conclusionary fashion, that
"Hispanics or Spanish-surnamed persons are a 'cognizable racial
group' for purposes of equal protection analysis under Batson."
Cantu I, 750 P.2d at 596 (footnote omitted) (citing Castaneda v.
Partida, 430 U.S. 482 (1977); and Fields v. People, 732 P.2d 1145
(Colo. 1987)).

Cf. U.S. v. Chalan, 812 F.2d 1302, 1314 (10th

Cir. 1987) (stating, without discussion, that Native Americans
are a cognizable racial group).

The Court mijp no reference to

footnote 125 in Tillman, 750 P.2d at 57 5 n.125, where it had
noted the warning in Hernandez that whether a distinctive group
actually exists is a question of fact in any {reticular
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community.

Given the Court's general citation to Castaneda, it

apparently found the following language from that case
controlling, notwithstanding the Hernandez warning:

"[I]t is no

longer open to dispute that Mexican-Americans are a clearly
identifiable class."

430 U.S. at 495 (citing Hernandez).

However, the Court's additional citation to Fields, the
Colorado case, is somewhat confusing.

En Fields, the issue

decided by the Colorado Supreme Court was "whether the
prosecution's use of peremptory challenges violated the
defendant's right to a trial by an impartial jury under the sixth
amendment to the federal constitution and article II, section 16
of the Colorado Constitution."

732 P.2d at 1151.

In holding

that "Spanish-surnamed people are a cognizable group for purposes
of determining whether a defendant has been denied the
opportunity for a jury composed of a fair cross-section of the
community" and that "a prosecutor's use of peremptory challenges
systematically to exclude Spanish-surnamed persons from the jury
deprives a defendant of the right to trial by an impartial jury
guaranteed by the sixth amendment and . . . the Colorado
Constitution," id. at 1146, 1153, the court specifically adopted
the sixth amendment fair cross-section standard for determining
cognizability that the California Supreme Court set forth in
People v. Wheeler —

i.e., "a group is legally cognizable if it

is defined on the basis of race, national origin, religion or
sex."

JId. at 1153 & n.15.

Therefore, the Cantu I Court's

reliance on Fields as support for its conclusion that "Hispanics
or Spanish-surnamed persons are a 'cognizable racial group' for
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equal protection analysis under Batson/' 750 P.2d at r>9t), it both
misplaced and directly contrary to its footnote in that same case
where it "reservefd] judgment on whether Hispanics are a
distinctive group under sixth amendment fair cross-section
analysis/' id. at 596 n.3 (citing State v. Tillman/ 750 P.2d 546
(Utah 1987)).
The absence in Cantu I of a clear statement of the
standard to be applied in determining cognizability under Batson,
coupled with the Court's seemingly inconsistent citations to
Castaneda and Fields, is troublesome.

The Cantu II Court's

subsequent citation to and apparent approval of the elements of a
prima facie case of bias enunciated in People v. Wheeler -- which
include "a showing that persons excluded belong to a cognizable
group under the representative cross-section rule" —
the problem.

compounds

See 778 P.2d at 518. This ambiguity in the Court's

Batson case law requires clarification.
As previously noted, the courts have pointedly
disagreed upon the proper standard to apply in determining
cognizability under Batson.
Harv. L. Rev. at 1020.

Note, Peremptory Challenges/ 102

At least one court has borrowed the

guidelines for sixth amendment analysis developed in Duren v.
Missouri/ 439 U.S. 357 (1979).

See United States v. SgrO/ 816

F.2d 30, 33 (1st Cir. I9H7), cert, denied/ 4IU 11 S

11063 (1988).

In Sgro, the court, in deciding that the defendant had failed to
demonstrate that "the undefined designation 'persons bearing
Italian-American surnames,' or even the designation rTldlianAmerican' meets the test promulgated by Duren . . . to establish
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a constitutionally cognizable class/' 816 F.2d at 33 (footnote
omitted), stated:
For a defendant to establish a prima facie
case of purposeful discrimination in the
selection of the petit jury, based solely on
evidence concerning the prosecutor's exercise
of peremptory challenges at the defendant's
trial, the defendant first must show that he
is a member of a cognizable racial group.
Batsonf 106 S.Ct. at 1722-1723; Castaneda v.
Partida, 430 U.S. 482f 492, 97 S.Ct. 1272,
1279, 51 L.Ed.2d 498 (1977).
Ibid.

It further observed:
[T]he standard that must be met to establish
that a group is constitutionally cognizable
is no longer subject to question. See Duren
v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 364, 99 S.Ct. 664,
668, 58 L.Ed.2d 579 (1979); Barber v. Ponte#
772 F.2d 982, 997 (1st Cir. 1985) (en banc).
The proponent must prove that (1) the group
must be definable and limited by some clearly
identifiable factor, (2) a common thread of
attitudes, ideas or experiences must run
through the group, and (3) there must exist a
community of interest among the members, such
that the group's interest caniot be
adequately represented if the group is
excluded from the jury selection process.

Ibid.

However, this approach was criticized in United States v.

Biaggi, 673 F.Supp. 96 (E.D.N.Y. 1987), aff'd, 853 F.2d 89 (2d
Cir. 1988), cert, denied, 109 S. Ct. 1312 (1989):
In order to satisfy the first prong of the
Batson three-part test, it must be shown that
Italian-Americans constitute a "cognizable
racial group." Batson, 106 S.Ct. at 1723.
The standard for determining cognizability
for equal protection objections to peremptory
challenges during jury selection under Batson
is the one set out in Castenada v. Partida,
430 U.S. 482, 494, 97 S.Ct. 1272, 1274, 51
L.Ed.2d 498 (1977), as is clear from the
Batson Court's direct citatiofi to Castaneda.
See Batson, 106 S.Ct. at 1723. This standard
defines as cognizable any group that is "a
recognizable, distinct class, singled out for
different treatment under the laws, as
-22-

written or as applied." Castaneda, 430 U.S.
at 494, 97 S.Ct. at 1274. See also United
States v. Dennis, 804 F.2d 1208, 1210 (11th
Cir. 1986), cert, denied,
U.S.
, 107
S.Ct. 1973, 95 L.Ed.2d 814 (1987), "(applying
Castaneda test to Batson analysis).
The government urges that, instead of
following Castaneda, the court should adopt
the reasoning of the First Circuit in United
States v. Sgro, 816 F.2d 30 (1st Cir. 1987),
which found the evidence insufficient to
establish that Italian-Americans are a
"cognizable racial group" under Batson.
There the First Circuit chose to borrow the
cognizability standard developed for the
Sixth Amendment requirement that the jury
venire represent a fair cross-section of the
population. See Sgro, 816 F.2d at 33
(employing the characteristics outlined in
Duren v. Missouri, 439 U.S. 357, 99 S.Ct.
664, 58 L.Ed.2d 579 (1979), and Barber v.
Ponte, 772 F.2d 982, 997 (1st Cir. 1985) (en
banc)). The Sgro court's borrowing act is
initially suspect because the Supreme Court
in Batson quite clearly commanded that
Castaneda govern its own use of the term
"cognizable racial group." See Batson, 106
S.Ct. at 1723.
Furthermore, there is an important
difference between the meaning of
cognizability in these two different
contexts. Discrimination against a group in
the cross-section of the venire, in violation
of the Sixth Amendment, may be demonstrated
by mere statistical underrepresentation of
that group. See Duren, 439 U.S. at 368 n.26,
99 S.Ct. at 670 n.26. Discrimination in the
use of peremptory challenges in violation of
the equal protection clause, by contrast,
necessitates a showing of the "essential
element" of "discriminatory purpose." Id.;
see Batson, 106 S.Ct. at 1723-24. Because
discrimination in the venire under the Sixth
Amendment may be statistical, the definition
of a "cognizable group" must be narrowly
drawn lest any group imaginable by defense
counsel be found numerically
underrepresented. See Barber, 772 F.2d at
999 (en banc) (warning that "blue-collar
workers, yuppies, Rotarians, Eagle Scouts,
and an endless variety of other
classifications" could receive protection).
-23-

Because the guarantee against
discrimination through peremptory challenges
requires a showing of purposef "cognizable
racial groups" may be defined less rigidly,
for it is precisely the evidence of
intentional exclusion of the group that helps
to identify the group. The First Circuit
itself made this distinction clear:
That is not to say, however, that
if a classification were specifically and systematically excluded
from jury duty the same standard
would be used as here, where defendant simply relies on a statistical
disparity in the venire to challenge its constitutionality [under
the fair cross-section rule]. If
certain people are specifically and
systematically excluded from jury
duty, then the jury-administrating
authority would have created its
own group.
Barber, 772 F.2d at 999-1000 (en banc)
(emphasis in original).
673 F.Supp. at 99-100.
Recognizing, nevertheless, that Sgro's criteria are
useful, the Biaggi court identified numerous common
characteristics of Italian-Americans (many of which were
judicially noticed) and concluded that under those criteria,
Italian-Americans are a cognizable group.

Id., at 100-01.

Additionally, it concluded that "[alternatively, ItalianAmericans are a 'cognizable racial group' under the less
restrictive Castaneda standard more properly applied to the
present Batson inquiry into purposeful discrimination by
peremptory challenges."

^d. at 101. The court observed that

"Italian-Americans are 'recognizable' and 'distinct,' and appear
to have been 'singled out for different treatment under the laws,
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as written or applied.' •' Ibid, (citing Castaneda/ 430 U.S. at
494.)
Sgro and Biaggi illustrate the difficulties that are
created by the absence of a clear standard in this Court's case
law for determining cognizability under the equal protection
analysis of Batson.

Although the distinctions between the

cognizability standard for purposes of fair cross-section
analysis and the cognizability standard for equal protection
analysis are perhaps not that pronounced, this Court clearly
recognized the distinctions in Tillman and emphasized the
importance of observing them.

Tillman, 750 P.2d at 575. Thus,

it is incumbent upon the Court to be more precise as to the
cognizability standard that is applicable to a Batson challenge
than it was in Cantu I and Cantu II. For Batson equal protection
analysis, the Biaggi court appears to be correct in concluding
that the standard set forth in Castaneda, which was specifically
cited in Batson, 476 U.S. at 94, is more appropriately applied.
The State recognizes that the Castaneda test of cognizability is
less restrictive (and, therefore, more easily met by the
defendant) than is the Duren test of cognizability.

See Tillman,

750 P.2d at 575-76; Biaggi, 673 F.Supp. at 101.
With the foregoing in mind, this Court need only
determine whether defendant has demonstrated that VietnameseAmericans are a cognizable racial group for purposes of Batson's
equal protection analysis. Although it might be argued that
Vietnamese-Americans are no less cognizable than other racial
groups who have already been recognized as cognizable for equal
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protection purposes,

defendant has offered nothing to establish

this fact, either in the trial court or in this Court. Cf.
Biaggi, 673 F.Supp. at 100-01•

He simply assumes that

Vietnamese-Americans are cognizable.

"At the very least, a party

seeking to invoke Batson must sketch out a fact-based prima facia
showing of cognizability . . .,"

Sgro, 816 F,2d at 33, whether

that be in the Castaneda sense or the Duren sense.

In short,

because defendant entirely failed to meet even this minimal
burden below, the trial court's order denying his motion was
proper.

See State v. Bryan, 709 P.2d at 260 (Court may uphold

the trial court's decision on any proper ground).
To summarize, defendant, who Is white, did not have
standing under Batson to raise an equal protection challenge to
an allegedly discriminatory peremptory strike of a prospective
juror who apparently was a Vietnamese-American.

Because

defendant did not raise in the trial court his alternative
constitutional arguments in support of his standing claim (i.e.,
the impartial jury/fair cross-section and due process analyses),
the Court should not consider them for the first time on appeal.
But, even if the Court were to assume, arguendo, that defendant
has standing under his proposed interpretation of Batson or on

See, e.g., Castaneda, 430 U.S. at 495 (Mexican-Americans are
cognizable); Roman v. Abrams, 822 F.2d 214 (2d Cir. 1987) (white
persons constitute a cognizable group), cert, denied, 109 S. Ct.
1311 (1989); United States v. Chalan, 8L2 F.2d 1302, 1313-14
(10th Cir. 1987) (summarily finding American Indians to be a
cognizable group under Batson).
For the same reasons, defendant has failed to meet the
cognizability requirement of Peters's due process analysis, even
though that requirement was stated in a slightly different manner
than were similar requirements in Castaneda and Duren.
or

one or more of the alternative constitutional bases he offers,
defendant fails to satisfy the cognizability requirements
(associated with the excluded group) that are inherent in each
approach.

For all these reasons, the Court should uphold the

trial court's denial of defendant's motion to quash.
POINT II
DEFENDANT IS NOT ENTITLED TO REVERSAL OF HIS
CONVICTION FOR ALLEGED PROSECUTORIAL
MISCONDUCT.
Defendant argues that the prosecutor was guilty of
misconduct that requires reversal of his conviction under the
authority of State v. Ubaldi, 462 A.2d 1001 (Conn. 1983), or,
alternatively, under this Court's case law regarding
prosecutorial misconduct, see, e.g., State v. Tucker, 727 P.2d
185, 187 (Utah 1986).

Defendant contends that the prosecutor

deliberately violated the trial court's order, made during an
unrecorded side bar conference, that the prosecutor was not to
question one of the State's witnesses, Grant Hodson, who was the
landlord at the apartment complex where the fire occurred, about
whether Hodson was a suspect in the fire.

The record is not

entirely clear as to the basis for the court's ruling on the
evidence, but the court apparently prohibited inquiry either on
relevancy grounds (see Utah R. Evid. 401) or on grounds of undue
prejudice (see Utah R. Evid. 403).12 Nor, contrary to
defendant's assertion, JS Ihf ,i>?i urd entirely rlear on the
question of whether the prosecutor deliberately violated the

The correctness of this ruling is not critical to the
resolution of the prosecutorial misconduct issue.
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court's order, in that the prosecutor did express possible
misunderstanding of the side bar ruling —

a statement that was

not challenged by the court (T. 418-19),

What is clear, however,

is that the prosecutor did violate the court's order restricting
the scope of the prosecutor's examination of Mr. Hodson (T. 41719).
In arguing for reversal under the circumstances
presented, defendant first urges the Court to apply the automatic
reversal rule applied by the Connecticut Supreme Court in Ubaldi,
462 A.2d at 1005-11. There, the court had before it the
questions of whether it "should grant a new trial in order to
deter prosecutorial misconduct which deliberately circumvents
trial court rulings and, if so, whether such authority should be
exercised in the circumstances presented."

462 A.2d at 1008.

Specifically, the prosecutor, in closing argument, had commented
on the defendant's failure to produce a witness who could not be
called to testify because the court had earlier ruled that the
witness had validly invoked his fifth amendment right to remain
silent.

Ixl. at 1010. The prosecutor's reference to the witness

obviously "implied an association of the defendant with a person
who had been identified as a 'bookie,'" which, in the context of
the case, was highly prejudicial to the defendant.

Ibid.

court noted:
The prosecutor's argument to the jury was
improper both because the inference sought
was clearly impermissible and because it
demonstrated a complete disregard for the
tribunal's rulings. The record of the
proceedings affords no reasonable inference
that the remark of an experienced prosecutor
was inadvertent . . . .
-9ft-

The

Id. at 1007. Recognizing that "[ujpsetting a criminal conviction
is a drastic step, but . . . is the only feasible deterrent to
flagrant prosecutorial misconduct in defiance of a trial court
ruling," id. at 1009 (emphasis added), the court declined to
apply the usual prejudice/fair trial standard of review for
prosecutorial misconduct and, under the particular circumstances
presented, applied a deterrence-oriented automatic reversal rule
to the case at bar.

Id., at 1006, 1009-10.

In reaching its

decision, the court noted the following important factors:
The trial court did not rebuke or admonish
the prosecutor upon the defendant's objection
to the improper argument. The trial court's
general charge to the jury which included the
standard instruction relating to the state's
burden of proof and the defendant's right to
remain silent, cannot reasonably be viewed as
obviating the harmfulness of the prosecutor's
remarks. Nor [was] the failure of the
defendant to request a curative instruction
in addition to a mistrial . . . fatal to his
claim where deliberate prosecutorial
misconduct was met by the trial court's
silence in response to a proper objection
during summation.
Id. at 1010 (citations omitted).

It concluded by stating:

Where a prosecutor in argument interjects
remarks deliberately intended to undermine
the ruling of the trial court to the
prejudice of the defendant, his conduct is so
offensive to the sound administration of
justice that only a new trial can effectively
prevent such assault on the integrity of the
tribunal.
Id. at 1011.
In many respects the Ubaldi reasoning is quite
appealing.

However, its approacl I is conti: ary to the approach

traditionally taken by this Court in addressing prosecutorial
misconduct claims, which require a showing of prejudice when
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misconduct is established.

See, e.g.# State v. Thomas, 777 P.2d

445, 447 (Utah 1989); State v. Thompson, 776 P.2d 48, 50-51 (Utah
1989); State v. Lafferty# 749 P.2d 1239, 1255 (Utah 1988).
Although some of this Court's decisions could be read as
suggesting that a different standard might apply to intentional
prosecutorial misconduct, see, e.g., State v. Tucker, 709 P.2d
313, 316 (Utah 1985) (citing State v. Wiswell, 639 P.2d 146 (Utah
1981)), the Court's opinion in State v. Troy, 688 P.2d 483 (Utah
1984), appears to indicate otherwise.

In Troy, the prosecutorial

misconduct was plainly characterized as intentional, yet the
Court applied the traditional prejudice test before deciding to
reverse the defendant's conviction.

683 P.2d at 486-87.

It may

be that this Court has implicitly adopted the view that "society
should not bear the burden of a new trial because of
prosecutorial misconduct where a new trial is not . . . mandated"
by sufficient prejudice to the defendant and that "the evil of
overzealous prosecutors is more appropriately combatted through
contempt sanctions, disciplinary boards or other means." Ubaldi,
462 A.2d at 1009 (discussing position and authorities contrary to
the position adopted by the court).
In any event, whether this Court should follow Ubaldi
if presented with facts similar to those presented there need not
be decided in the context of the instant case.

The flagrant

prosecutorial misconduct, coupled with inadequate court response,
present in Ubaldi simply does not exist in defendant's case.
Although defendant doubts the prosecutor's sincerity, the
prosecutor, apparently to the satisfaction of the trial court,
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maintained that his violation of the court's ruling was not
intentional (T. 419). Furthermore, the court here, unlike the
trial court in Ubaldi, took prompt ameliorative action by
sustaining defendant's objection to the improper question posed
to Mr. Hudson and striking Hodson's answer with an admonition to
the jury to disregard it (T. 414). See Tuckerf 709 P.2d at 316.
Indeed, the court noted its ameliorative actions in denying
defendant's motion for a mistrial (T. 417). Finally, and perhaps
most importantly, after the mistrial was denied, defendant's
counsel asked Mr. Hodson the following question on crossexamination:

"Mr. Hodson, you've never been questioned as a

suspect in this fire, have you?"

(T. 422-23.)

That question,

although not as direct as the prosecutor's "Did you start that
fire?"

(T. 414), plainly explores the very same subject matter

that defendant argues the prosecutor impermissibly inquired into
in flagrant violation of the court's ruling.

Given this,

defendant is not in a position to claim reversible error under
either the Ubaldi standard or the standard of review
traditionally applied by this Court.

See Tillman, 750 P.2d at

560-61.
The foregoing discussion effectively disposes of
defendant's alternative argument that "under traditional
analysis, the trial court abused its discretion in denying
appellaj

* • >t ion foj a mistrial based on the prosecutor's

misconduct."

Br. of Appellant at 34-35 (footnote omitted).

State v. Speer, 750 P.2d 186 (Utah 1988), this Court said:
In reviewing a claim of prosecutorial
misconduct, we must determine if the
-31-

In

prosecutor's remarks calls [sic] to the
attention of the jurors matters they would
not be justified in considering in reaching
the verdict and, if so, whether there is a
reasonable likelihood that the misconduct so
prejudiced the jury that there would have
been a more favorable result absent the
misconduct. State v. Tillman,
P.2d
,
72 Utah Adv. Rep. 6 (Dec. 22, 1987); State v.
Fisher, 680 P.2d 35, 36 (Utah 1984). In
determining whether a remark or question by
the prosecution had such an effect, the
alleged misconduct must be viewed in light of
the totality of the trial. No one is in a
more advantageous position to view the
incident in the context of the trial than the
trial judge; therefore, his ruling on whether
the conduct of the prosecution warranted a
mistrial will not be overturned absent an
abuse of discretion. State v. Hodges, 30
Utah 2d 367, 370 517 P.2d 1322, 1324 (1974).
750 P.2d at 190.

In the context of the entire trial, the

prosecutor's question which is challenged by defendant was not
that significant.

Any prejudice it may have created for

defendant was significantly diminished by defense counsel's
questioning of Mr. Hodson on the same subject matter.

And, as

discussed in Point III of this brief, there was substantial
evidence of defendant's guilt, which lessened the possibility
that the jury was influenced by the prosecutor's misconduct.

See

State v. Troy, 688 P.2d at 486 ("If proof of defendant's guilt is
strong, the challenged conduct or remark will not be presumed
prejudicial.") (quoting State v. Seeger, 4 Or.App. 336, 479 P.2d
240 (1971)).

Finally, the prompt ameliorative actions by the

court upon defendant's objection further obviated any harm that
might have resulted to defendant.

See Tucker, 709 P.2d at 316.

Accordingly, under the abuse of discretion standard enunciated in
Speer7 the court's denial of defendant's motion for a mistrial
should be upheld.
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POINT III
THERE WAS SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE PRESENTED AT
TRIAL TO SUPPORT DEFENDANT'S CONVICTION.
Defendant argues that the evidence presented at trial
was insufficient to support the jury's findings that an arson was
committed and that defendant committed it.
In State v. Booker, 709 P.2d 342 (Utah 1985), the Utah
Supreme Court set out the well established standard for appellate
review of the sufficiency of evidence to suppor t a jury verdict
in a criminal case.

It stated:

[W]e review the evidence and all
inferences which may reasonably
be drawn from it in the light
most favorable to the verdict of
the jury. We reverse a jury
conviction for insufficient evidence only when the evidence, so
viewed, is sufficiently inconclusive or inherently improbable
that reasonable minds must have
entertained a reasonable doubt
that the defendant committed the
crime of which he was convicted.
In reviewing the conviction, we do not
substitute our judgment for that of the jury.
"It is the exclusive function of the jury to
weigh the evidence and to determine the
credibility of the witnesses . . . .M
...
So long as there is some evidence, including
reasonable inferences, from which findings of
all the requisite elements of the crime can
reasonably be made, our inquiry stops. . . .
709 P.2d at 345 (citations omitted).

Add i tiona] 1 y, on

conflicting evidence, the Court is obliged to accept that version
of the facts which supports the verdict; the existence of
contradictory evidence or of conflicting inferences does not
warrant disturbing the jury's verdict.
91, 97 (Utah 1982).

State v. Howell, 649 P.2d

"Nor is it [the Court's] function to
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determine guilt or innocence or the . . . credibility of
conflicting evidence and the reasonable inferences to be drawn
therefrom."

State v. Watts, 675 P.2d 566, 568 (Utah 1983).

Circumstantial evidence alone may support a conviction.

State v,

Nickles, 728 P.2d 123, 126 (Utah 1986) (upholding arson
convictions).
When the evidence presented at trial in support of
defendant's conviction (as summarized i:.i this brief's statement
of facts) is viewed in light of the foregoing standards, it
clearly was legally sufficient, even though primarily
circumstantial.

Defendant's attack on the sufficiency of the

evidence is little more than a request that this Court ignore
substantial direct and circumstantial evidence that supports his
conviction and instead to accept his speculation as to what
occurred on the night of the crime.

Clearly, that is not the

function of this Court in reviewing the sufficiency of the
evidence.
CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing arguments, defendant's
^J-Jh~~

conviction should be affirmed.
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